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THROUGH A THREE PLAYER, TWO-LEVEL GAME
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7047 Batten Arts and Letters
Norfolk, VA 23529, USA
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ABSTRACT
Is Vladimir Putin a bad strategist, perhaps irrational? Previous military activity by Russia, such as the
annexation of Crimea of 2014, yielded limited international gains, at a significant economic and
reputational cost. Yet as the 2022 invasion of Ukraine shows, Putin is willing to commit military power,
despite the cost of sanctions and other possible retaliation. This three-player simultaneous game,
originally created in June, 2021, demonstrates how domestic and international considerations of President
Vladimir Putin might lead to otherwise unpredictable Russian military behavior. In this extended version
of Robert Putnam’s “two-level game,” President Putin rationally uses the international venue as a field of
manipulation towards his domestic audience. He is not a bad strategist; he is playing a different game –
for his own benefit. This game foreshadowed the Russian invasion of Ukraine by nine months and
describes what to expect next.
Keywords: Game, Matrix, Russia, Ukraine, Future
1

INTRODUCTION

The world seems to be entering a new period of world order. While drafting this paper, Russia launched a
full-scale conventional joint –forces attack against Ukraine. However, previous military activity by
Russia, yielded limited international gains, at a significant economic and reputational cost. From a purely
international standpoint, especially a western liberal perspective, these decisions appear to be nonsensical,
or irrational. In fact, there is no shortage of media coverage deciphering that President Putin is
“strategically incompetent” (Rovner 2015) or having “brilliant tactics, but bad strategy” (Arnold
2014).But is President Putin not only immoral, but irrational?
The central research question of this paper is if Russia’s international military conflict leads to negative
international reaction, what kind of rationality leads it to be repeatedly being used? Tools of game theory
provide a unique way to separate analysis from emotion and ethnocentrism that creep into questions like
these. While a game cannot say what is right or wrong, it can help demonstrate why certain decisions
might be made in the context of the players’ value systems. In fact, this is exactly the aim of this paper,
which places President Putin in the position of an autocratic decision maker, whose demonstrated
deviation from norms of democratic power-sharing and transition lend credence to the idea that he acts in
his own self-interest – for his legacy, personal gain, and survival. To do so, this paper integrates Robert
Putnam’s “two-level game” concept, with President Putin as the negotiator between domestic and
international audiences, for his personal interests.
A simultaneous three-player game (1. Putin / 2. Russian Domestic Audience / 3. Liberal International
Order) demonstrates how personal, domestic and international considerations might combine in the
autocratic mind of President Vladimir Putin, leading to Russia’s demonstrated military behavior. In this
extended “two-level game,” President Putin rationally uses the international venue as a field of
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manipulation towards his domestic audience, where his own most important outcomes lie. This game was
originally created in June of 2021, well before Russian forces massed around Ukraine.
Further, analysis of the proposed game predicts that armed conflict in non-NATO nations should be
expected, because international costs do not outweigh domestic benefits. Further assertions from this
game include that NATO countries are likely to continue experiencing malign activities below the
threshold of armed conflict, because these activities are insufficient to trigger NATO Article 5 reciprocity.
Ultimately, the support of the Russian people is the critical element of this game, and Putin effectively
eliminates vectors of opposition. Meanwhile, the liberal order is doing little to reinforce Russian domestic
opposition. Therefore, Russian military expansion into non-NATO nations is likely to continue, unless the
liberal order creates significantly different approaches. However, greater intervention may come with
equal or greater risks overall. In addition to fomenting pockets of disruption, Putin is likely to continue
allying with China, despite its role as a rising threat to Russia. Likely, these factors aggregate to an
acceleration of the rise of China, a slowing of growth in European liberalism, and the possibility of
defection by non-aligned states to commit to an altered world order.
2

BACKGROUND

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly-formed Russian state stepped back from Great Power
competition. Russia’s military foray in Serbia in 1999 clearly demonstrated significant shortcomings
(Arbatov, 2000). Through the early 2000’s, Russia mostly concerned itself with internal conflicts such as
the first and second Chechen Wars. However, Russia slowly began applying military power outside its
own borders, starting with Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and continuing frozen
conflicts in Donbas, Ukraine, and Transdniestria, Moldova (Nichol 2014). By 2015, Russia moved
beyond its near-abroad by deploying national military and paramilitary forces to Syria and Libya
(Rondeaux 2020). The latest military activity was the invasion of Ukraine along multiple axis in 2022.
The goals of Russian foreign policy has been described as pursuing four overlapping areas including
recognition as a great power, a player in a multilateral world order, expanding the Russian sphere of
influence, and an emphasis of sovereignty for great powers (Renz 2018). Russian military and intelligence
activities led to sanctions by the United States and other nations that caused limited (World Bank 2021) to
widespread (The Economist 2021) economic impacts. While some may argue economic sanctions
strengthened the Russian economy through greater independence, the nation is growing more isolated and
potentially losing opportunities for growth (Cordell 2019). As Michel (2014) notes, “[e]ither the world
has embraced Russophobia or, more likely, Moscow’s policies have engendered enough spite and disdain
that Russia has become the most loathed nation extant”. While Russia’s military activity may attempt to
signal great power status, the effects have yet to lead to more influence as a trusted member of a
multilateral world order. If anything, these activities might have increased cohesion and resistance within
liberal institutions, such as NATO. Furthermore, Russia’s sphere of influence is limited to the areas it
physically controls – hardly a hardy return to imperial or Soviet glory. Assuming that international
success is the policy aim, many use these mixed results as evidence of President Vladimir Putin status as
a “bad strategist” (Arnold, 2014; Rovner, 2015; Tsereteli, 2018).
Russia’s strategic position is more complicated though. Geography, population, and history impact
leadership and the domestic audience. For example, the size and span of the Eurasian Russian state point
to both its most pressing external and internal security concern. The first is its extended border, much of
which is dominated by sparsely populated areas, subject to perforation. China actually dominates the
larger span of this border, with NATO nations covering only a small portion. However, the collective
Russian history is shaped by Cold War threats and invasions by Germany, Napoleonic France, Swedes,
Poles and Ottomans. Moscow’s proximity to these historical activities shape fears much more than distant
Japanese island seizures or Mongol Hordes. In fact Chechen internal conflict and the pull of dozens of
constituent nationalities are more likely to seize the imagination of the Russian public. As Renz (2018)
states when speaking on modernization and use, “Russia’s military revival is as much about concerns
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related to domestic order and regime stability as it is about global power projection and competition.”
Russia has regional military commands, not global ones. While able to project more forces than they have
in recent years, they remain focused at home and in the near abroad.
Russia might have more global ambitions if they had the means. Yet Russia capabilities are an odd mix of
educational competency, demographic difficulty, and most importantly a system devoid of trust. Because
of a lack of liberal system, the economy fails to provide a strong engine to produce advanced capabilities
in mass quantities. Purchases of military equipment are tied to the ups-and-downs of commodity markets,
especially petrochemical sales - not a well-diversified economy. This allows Russia to create exquisite
bespoke capability, but not to field them. Year after year, Moscow fails to find the funds to support a full
modernization program. They continue research and development to keep pace and support foreign
military sales, but cannot field a non-nuclear force that could defeat NATO. This is on top of strong
evidence of wide spread corruption and failures to disclose any sort of capability shortcomings.
Why the centrality of Putin over the population? A “Putin-first” foreign policy is not inconsistent with
historical precedent. Russia is no stranger to cults of personality (Cassiday and Johnson 2010). Today’s
reliance on orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality are tools that harkens back to Nicholas I (Cannady and
Kubicek 2014). Russians do not mind a strong leader; in fact they may prefer it, especially their standard
of living improves. However, without liberal institutions to support a strong economy, delivering on
domestic hopes is difficult. Therefore, Putin must deliver in the good times and distract his people when
he cannot. Further, there is no historical tradition of regular democratic power transitions in Russia.
For the leader in power, why would you ever leave? In an illiberal state, there is no incentive for the
leadership to relinquish power. Maintaining their position allows them to increase wealth and prestige.
Leaving these positions releases control of the systems that enriched them, and increases the risk that
someone may find incriminating evidence of work against the people they controlled. As an autocrat,
Putin’s primary motivations focus on his own survival and power, the supporters who maintain his power,
and then the state as a reflection of his legacy. Putin likely assesses that threats to his power are unlikely
from external sources, with the exception of one vector – an external state-sponsored revolution, coups, or
other unplanned removal from power. However, the focus on so-called “color revolutions”, whether real
or imagined, can be used to reinforce attention back onto the domestic audience as a possible threat
source. Russia is not threatened by liberalism, but Putin and his circle are. This is a major reason why
Russia’s foreign policy can be aligned to a rising China.
3

STRUCTURING THE GAME

Understanding the complex background of the situation it is possible to synthesize the possible futures
that outline the game. Before outlining the choices that create the future, some “Rules of Thumb” are
outlined to guide synthesis.









Nuclear weapons limit the size of strategic opportunism; this constrains realists’ pursuits and may
force compromises
Russia is historically predisposed to worry about its extended border, predisposed to strong
leadership, and wants to be taken seriously as world power; Putin will appeal to these collective
historical fears and hopes
Russia has the veneer of democracy but lack strong liberal values; it is an illiberal democracy
NATO is not an actual existential threat to the Russian State, as its greatest border distances are
covered by China and other nations.
Historic threats have come from the west, not from the east
Russia, as a declining state (relative to its status as the USSR and to the rise of China) is more
likely to suffer from internal conflict
Liberalism is not a threat to Russia, but it is a threat to Vladimir Putin’s individual rule, from
internal and possibly external actors
Putin sees the west and NATO represents a liberal threat to him (not Russia)
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Putin recognizes the threat of domestic liberalization to him; he is fighting “emancipation” of the
individual (Booth, 1991)
A the ruler of an illiberal state, there is no incentive to diffuse or turn over power; it is not
expected by the population as long as their needs are met.

Additionally, Russia and the west faced with more opportunities and responsibilities than they have
resources, causing them to pick and choose where they engage. These choices are made at the intersection
between the domestic audience, the leader, and the international audience. In "Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games" (1988), Robert Putnam sought to explain the process of
international negotiation through a two-stage process, which is used as a template for decision making in
this model. Representatives of each nation negotiated at “Level 1” and each respective representative also
reached back to domestic constituents for implicit or explicit ratification of the agreement. In order for an
international negotiation to be successful, its outcome must fit within the “win-set” of the acceptable
outcomes to the domestic audience. Larger win-sets make agreements at Level-1 more likely; however,
too much Level II win-space makes negotiation more difficult as the other side knows there is room to
“give”. In this analysis, the idea of “negotiation” is extended to any interaction between international or
domestic audiences, where some sort of give-and-take is possible. In other words, a national leader like
Putin can act as a “negotiator” of not just world order, but his own position in it. The primary argument of
this game is if Russia’s international behavior is viewed using a three-player game, then the autocrat’s
behavior (Putin) is focused on maximizing the game level with the most beneficial valence to him, in this
case the domestic (level II) audience. In that case, anything that maximizes Putin’s benefit would
demonstrate he is not a bad strategist; he is playing the long-term home-game to his advantage. This is
the basic premise of the findings of this game: Vladimir Putin is driven primarily by personal enrichment,
along with political and physical survival (Hill and Gaddy 2013). Concerns on the international stage are
primarily important as a lever for the president’s continuation and expansion of personal power.
Therefore, he acts to retain, sustain, and expand power through regional conflict, because it is the best
option of a “bad hand”.
3.1 The Playing Field: Parallel Worlds
Between the rules of thumb and the basic understanding of Putin’s motivations, the various choices of the
players can be mapped out. The combination of the three players creates eight “parallel worlds” to
explore in the game. Below is a description of those worlds, starting with a short-hand name, followed by
an outline of players’ choices, then the description of the world.
World 1 – “Globalization Glasnost”: Putin chooses relatively benign competition, the Russian people
support him, and the liberal order chooses benign competition. Russia plays by the rules of the liberal
order, participating in free trade, and allowing for a basically free exchange of ideas and culture. This
removes many of the barriers presented by sanctions, allowing the growth of the Russian economy. This
enlightened approach improves the state of the Russian people and its international trading partners. With
a lack of conflict, neither side bears the loss of military personnel or equipment. This is an ideal situation,
except for an autocrat. Initially, Putin receives high praise. Yet under the influence of soft power, rising
expectations, and relative power of competitors reduce his time in power. The liberal order and Russian
people prosper, but Putin does not gain as much as he might otherwise.
World 2 – “Internal Entropy”: Putin chooses relatively benign competition, the Russian people do not
support him, but the liberal order does not take active involvement. In this case, Putin’s reversal of
behavior and reproachment with the west is seen as a sign of weakness and a signal to opposition he is
vulnerable. Although Putin may see advantages in international engagement, it is ultimately for his
benefit. Russia’s international engagement earns him a wide berth in sovereign issues from the
international community, which allows him to focus the full force of his security apparatus to squashing
domestic resistance. While Russia does not adopt full human rights for its citizens, the liberal order
retains or expands liberalization throughout the world, because Russia is not interfering over abroad.
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Internally the Russian people suffer the consequences of political repression and internal violence. Putin
retains power, but at the cost of true domestic support, and is continuously skirmishing.
World 3 – “Rapid Expansion”: In this configuration, Putin chooses regional conflict, the people support
this decision, and the liberal order does little to halt this activity. Putin reads the liberal order’s redline as
including only those states that are secure inside of NATO’s Article 5 protection. Putin directs increasing
“gray zone” activities as preamble to conventional regional military occupation. Belarus is absorbed into
a strengthened “Union State” triggering a wave of attempted secessions across non-NATO, Russian
enclaves. The liberal order proves either unable to mount a unitary response or judges a strong response to
be contradictory to its best interests. While the liberal order avoids international conflict, its credibility
and influence suffer. While the Russian people bear some short-term costs to these conflicts, the activity
is mostly limited and outweighed by a newfound greater-Russo identity and larger trade area, which
improves their quality of life. This translates to stronger support and greater influence for Putin, further
expanding his long-term influence and control.
World 4 – “Regional Chaos”: This case sees Putin choosing conflict, but the Russian people do not
support this activity, but the liberal order does not intercede in either the external or internal conflict. By
remaining out of the conflict, the liberal order loses face as the keeper of international order but retains
their blood and treasure. A strong anti-Putin movement sees the population lose freedoms and possibly
their lives, either as part of a government crackdown, or on the frontlines of the external conflict. The
turmoil of a near revolution combined with the requirements of large-scale regional conflict takes a large
toll on the economic welfare of the population. Putin takes the blame with the population and his attempts
at quelling his detractors fuels the resistance, possibly to a bloody end.
World 5 – “Cold Shoulder”: Putin chooses benign competition instead of armed conflict in an attempt
to repair relations, the Russian people support this move of reconciliation, but the liberal order’s reaction
is lukewarm at best. After years of distrust, the liberal order sees the Russian move as a sign of internal
weakness and attempts to setup a conditional reconciliation. Some sanctions are lifted, boosting the
economy; the carrot is paired with a stick of NATO expansion. The Russian people seem content with
their newfound relative prosperity, but Putin suffers from a lack of regional influence, and new vectors of
soft power into the country likely spell the end for a lifetime of rule. The liberal order benefits from the
expansion of trade and security, without the loss of military power that conflict would bring.
World 6 – “Everyone is Against Me”: When Putin chooses benign competition, the Russian people
cannot understand the sudden reversal and do not support it. Meanwhile, the liberal order chooses active
regional involvement, expanding NATO and assisting internal dissent with targeted sanctions against
Putin’s financial interests and supporters. Putin cracks down on dissent, causing economic and human
rights issues against the Russian people. While the Russian people suffer, Putin is deposed. While the
liberal order expands and creates a more stable Europe, Russia suffers long term as different interests vie
for power in the vacuum left by Putin’s departure.
World 7 – “Underdog Victory”: In this scenario, Putin is bolstered by the success of incremental
increases in regional conflicts and the Russian people support him, but the liberal order pushes back.
With staunch support of the Russian people and ethnic Russians abroad, Putin is emboldened to make
large territorial grabs. The liberal order is caught flat-footed by the suddenness of these moves and
mounts and unsuccessful military response. Unwillingly to escalate to nuclear warfare, the liberal order is
bloodied, in recession, and with losses of what they thought were future members of their ideological
club. While the Russian people take pride in the victory, they are forced to accept a lower standard of
living for an extended period to pay for the large-scale operations. Putin on the other hand receives direct
credit for the move and secures more regional and domestic influence and control.
World 8 – “Doomsday”: In this final scenario, Putin chooses conflict, leading to escalation to a largescale conflict with the liberal order. Meanwhile, the Russian population sees this move as an
unforgivable betrayal of their former compliance and resists the President. Faced with external and
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internal dissention, Putin faces reduced areas of control. With the prospects of literally nothing to lose, he
lashes out in a desperate attempt at gaining a foothold by using tactical nuclear weapons, meant to be a
regional trip line to stop advancing NATO forces. Instead, it leads to a nuclear exchange between Russia
and NATO. This is certainly the worst case of all the scenarios.
3.2 A Game Theoretical Approach
This analysis uses a three-player game, where each player has two choices, which establishes eight areas
of comparison. Despite the relative simplicity of this model, it does allow for the exploration of a number
of outcomes. An example of the game structure is shown in Table 1. The numbers in each cell are a
reference to discuss the context of each of the situations that emerge from the players’ actions.
Table 1 - Determining the eight "Worlds" of Analysis, by combining the choices of three players.

3. Liberal Order

Supports / Neutral
Does Not Support

1. Putin
Competition
Conflict
2. Russian People
Supports
Not
Supports
Not
Putin
Support
Putin
Support
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Figure 1 - The Extensive Form
For this simplified game (Figure 1), each player has two choices. As Player 1, Putin can execute two
broad strategies, either to compete peacefully through mostly diplomatic, informational, and economic
ways, or to use military conflict as a primary way to achieve his autocratic goals. The Russian People
(Player 2) have the choice to support or not support the President to different degrees. Finally, the liberal
order can either support (or not interfere) Russia’s international actions, or it can actively work against
those goals by imposing sanctions or conducting counter-military interventions. The combination of these
choice-sets creates eight worlds. Table 2 shows how each player aligns to the seven-level scoring system.
These scores cannot be aggregated inside of any particular player, for example if the liberal world order is
destroyed, then it is assumed that loss of influence and war likely preceded or accompanied that outcome.
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Table 2 - Scoring Ranges for Each Player
3

Liberal Order
True Multilateralism

Russian People
High Affluence/Actualization

2

Expanded Liberalization

Long Term QoL Gains

1

Acceptable Competitors

Short Term QoL Gains

0
-1
-2
-3

Status Quo
Loss of Influence
War
Liberal Order Destroyed

Status Quo
Higher Needs Struggle
Basic Needs Struggle
Death

Putin
Full Control, Max Affluence &
Influence
Expanded Long Term
Influence/Affluence
Expanded Short Term
Influence/Affluence
Status Quo / Uncertainty
Loss of Influence
Regime Change
Death

For Russian People, societal motivations reflect a version of a simplified Maslow hierarchy played out on
a societal scale. On the negative side of the spectrum, death not only includes outcomes for the individual,
but for their families and communities. It might be experienced in gradients such as lower birth rates and
lower life spans, or suddenly with a massive nuclear exchange. Other negative scores indicate the
struggles of meeting food, shelter, or other survival needs. On the positive side, the people experience the
world climbing up through Maslow’s hierarchy, reaching higher levels of affluence and actualization.
While Putin is also an individual, he is one that has accumulated enough wealth that he is unlikely to ever
worry about meeting his basic needs. Therefore, his considerations are focused on accumulating
resources, esteem, and his own form of actualization (or self-interest). Although these higher needs spread
across the scoring system, on the negative side the lowest score take a precipitous drop into bloody
revolution, coup, or other a sudden death.
3.3 Results
Joining the strategic form template, the scoring guidelines, and qualitative description of each world, a
simultaneous non-zero-sum game is created (Table 3). When Putin’s choices are treated as two separate
games, two Nash Equilibriums are present, aligning with Worlds 1 and 3 (highlighted in green). Between
the two games, World 3: Expanding Power, where Putin chooses conflict, the liberal order does not fight
back, and the Russian people support their President, is both a Nash Equilibrium and the best score for
President Putin. His next best option is highlighted in yellow.
Table 3 – When treated as two separate games, two Nash Equilibriums emerge. Only one has a positive
score for Putin. His “second best” option is highlighted in yellow.
1. Putin
Competition

3. Liberal Stay Out of It
Order
Active Involvement

Supports
Putin
(-1,3,3)
(-1,2,2)

Conflict

2. Russian People
Not
Supports
Support
Putin
(-1,2,-2)
(2,2,-1)
(-2,-2,2)
(1,-1,-2)

Not
Support
(-1,-2, 1)
(-3,-3,-3)
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Figure 2 – Scoring the Extensive form game
Stepping through iterated dominance helps construct a narrative of the situation. Examining the first
iteration, we see that Russian people are “in for a penny, in for a pound,” such as it were. While there are
scenarios with positive results for rejecting Putin, they are strictly dominated by outcomes of support.
With the elimination of resistance to Putin off of the table, he is no longer incentivized to pursue a less
confrontational perspective. In other words, Putin is pushed towards creating a conflict for his benefit.
Additionally, it is in the liberal order’s best interest to reduce their exposure. With this scoring system
representing the three value systems, it is rational for Putin to start a conflict if he can ensure the liberal
order will minimize their response, and in a way that he maintains the support of the people.
3.4 Discussion
The life of the autocrat is often a self-fulfilling prophecy between two extremes. On one hand, if Putin
chooses the path of benign interaction with the international order, he is likely to lose economic and
informational battles over the long term, as soft power slowly erodes his base of power. On the other
hand, if he overplays his power, he could end up creating the conditions for the destruction of his state or
his removal from power, when military adventurism goes wrong. Putin plays within a limited window
where outcomes are positive for him. The opportunities in this window depend on maintaining the
support of the people, but not necessarily of the international community. This is compatible with an
autocratic model, since the leader maintains power over their population, more so than the international
community. Even if the scoring system of this game is slightly flawed, it is rational for Putin to solidify
his domestic standing, whether it is at the expense of his or Russia’s international reputation.
This assertion matches the behavior demonstrated by Russia in recent years. From Moldova to Ukraine,
or Georgia to Syria, Putin only employed military force in locations that are weaker, uncared for by the
liberal order, or without strong partner. Luckily for Putin, there are no shortage of weaker states in its
immediate vicinity where he can flex the military strength that may often respected by the Russian people
as a sign of political vitality. This is one of the ways Putin is able to use conflict as a means toward
greater domestic coherence. For example, Putin legitimizes military action by weaponizing Responsibility
to Protect principles, arguing that ethnic Russian minorities are being discriminated in former Soviet
spaces, requiring intervention. This is generally a sufficient justification for a domestic audience while
expanding a pan-Russo identity across borders. A bonus for Putin is that these conflicts temporarily
obscure pathways to greater EU/NATO integration. Putin also harnesses international reactions to
reinforce his narratives. NATO’s reinforcement of the “eastern flank” through enhanced Forward
Presence (eFP) units is spun as proof of the West’s expansion and Russian isolation.
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However, the game is played differently in locations with relative strength. For example, Russia’s
burgeoning partnership with China may be less about their shared Communist histories and more about
alignment with the lesser of two perceived “evils.” Wolford (2019) discusses the phenomenon of rising
and falling powers in games. If Putin judges China as a rising power, and the United States as a relative
declining power to China, Russia can benefit from its current alignment. Also, while China is a borderthreat to Russia, its challenges are in locations away from the population centers of western Russia. China
is likely interpreted as a more obscure threat than the more proximate and historic “challenge” of NATO,
Europe, and the United States. While Putin increases military operations, large-scale conflict remains
restricted to non-NATO and less powerful states.
Putin’s assumed direction of the use of force allows him to maintain or gain domestic support, while the
liberal order does not take significant action against him. This maximizes his outcomes according to the
game. This is not to say that Russia does not act against the liberal order, vis-à-vis NATO or the United
States. However, this model asserts there is a qualitative difference in the type of interference, for a clear
quantitative reason. That reason is NATO’s Article 5, which is understood as guaranteeing collective
defense in the case of attack on one or more members. If Russia attacks a NATO nation, there is high
likelihood of specific reciprocity to their actions. For conventional or nuclear attack, Article 5 establishes
a clear red-line where a military activity on Russia’s part could lead to such a large response that Putin
would be likely to lose his domestic support, if not life, due to the response by the allies.
For example, if Russia were to launch military action in a NATO nation, the counterattack could be
devastating. On one hand, Russia’s operational advantages in basing, interior lines, and short-range
objectives could allow rapid progress in a Baltic invasion scenario (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). However,
Russia’s strategic disadvantages are significant if faced with a resolute NATO counteraction. With a
determined NATO force, otherwise advantageous positions such as Kaliningrad become exposed
liabilities. If Russia faced significant losses in sovereign territory, it would be difficult to maintain
domestic support long term. Long term military action would also be a drain on the economy and
population, both of which remain in recovery after years of post-Soviet decay. As military activity
escalated, it is difficult to see how the situation would prevent an exchange of nuclear weapons.
Russia’s historic activity seems to highlight the walking of the fine line of competition and conflict in
NATO states. Russia stands accused of a variety of disruptions including cyber-attacks in Estonia,
sponsoring paramilitary motor-cycle gangs in Slovakia, or interfering with elections in the United States
and beyond. In nearly every case, these activities are not recognized as war in any traditional sense. These
so-called gray-zone activities below the threshold of widespread conflict currently impact the cohesion of
the liberal order, but avoids triggering Article 5. Article 5 exists abstractly in the oval highlighted section
in the strategic form (Table 4), between active conflict with the liberal order and regional conflict where
the liberal order does not intercede.
Table 4 - Highlighting the existence of Article 5 deterrence.
Putin
Competition

Liberal
Order

Stay Out of It
Active Involvement

Supports
Putin
(-1,3,3)
(-1,2,2)

Conflict

Russian People
Not
Supports
Support
Putin
(-1,2,-2)
(2,2,-1)
(-2,-2,2)
(1,-1,-2)

Not
Support
(-1,-2, 1)
(-3,-3,-3)

As seen in Table 5, Putin is straddling the border between the support and non-support of his population.
In this game, the support of the liberal order is secondary to the support of the Russian people, because
the stakes are higher for that player pairing. For example, the difference when the liberal order is not
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interceding, between the population supporting and not supporting, is a value of “3”. Alternatively, the
difference between the liberal order being inactive or active while the Russian people are supporting is
only a value of “1”. Further, the importance of the international situation is only in the degree of “win”
Putin may receive. Therefore, if risk must be assumed, it is rational to expect Putin to assume that risk in
his actions with the international community, not the domestic audience where he has more to lose. His
actions will reflect those that may shore up domestic identity and support, without tipping into areas like
Russia-NATO war that might create short term coherence, but his eventual downfall.
Table 5 - The area of unacceptable risk is the line between domestic support and resistance; it is the
difference between a win and a loss for Putin.
Putin
Competition

Liberal
Order
4

Stay Out of It
Active Involvement

Supports
Putin
(-1,3,3)
(-1,2,2)

Conflict
Russian People
Not
Supports
Not
Support
Putin
Support
(-1,2,-2)
(2,2,-1)
(-1,-2, 1)
(-2,-2,2)
(1,-1,-2)
(-3,-3,-3)

IMPLICATIONS FOR NEAR TERM ORDER

The analysis of this game highlights how Putin’s choices could represent a rational individual choice to
maximize outcomes, which is contradictory to a popular narrative in national security writing. In the
following section, the analysis is extended to suggest the ramifications to world order, through the eyes of
the NATO defended liberal order, non-NATO nations, as well as the Russian people. Assertions are
presented under two conditions – whether the game continues to be played as is, or whether Putin or the
Liberal Order try to change the game.
The first assertion is that Putin’s behavior of conducting conflict will not spread to NATO nations as long
as Article 5 ramifications are clearly communicated and are not diluted by military deterrence in nonNATO nations. This assertion goes back to Table 4 that demonstrated can benefit from conflict, as long as
the liberal order does not fight back (World 7) or escalates (World 8). However, for this deterrence to be
credible against a nuclear armed Russia, the threatened response must be capable of reaching incredibly
high levels. Therefore, deterrence must be limited to those spaces where the use of all options is a realistic
possibility, and not to every conflict, lest credibility is lost. Second, military action and other malign
activity against non-NATO nations will continue unless clear punitive measures are emplaced against
Putin or his domestic support base. However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, the threat or use of
force in response to any conflict is not a realistic deterrent for the liberal order to use over the long term.
Therefore, undermining domestic support may be the next best option.
There are basically two vectors for the liberal order to affect the game. The first would be to change the
outcomes to Putin, second is to impact the support of the domestic audience. Unfortunately, there are no
positive scoring scenarios for Putin in the competition game. The liberal order would have to find ways to
change this, which is difficult since Putin’s interests are in opposition to western values. However, the
opportunity for acceptable incentives may present itself over time. Increasing the costs levied for Russian
malign activity is also difficult, because “punishments” for activities in non-NATO start to resemble the
consequences for interfering in NATO countries. When these lines blur, the game “shifts right,” giving
Putin nothing to lose. An autocrat with nothing to lose is a dangerous thing.
Putin changes the domestic game by eliminating vectors of resistance. For example, previously
independent radio, television, and web-based brands are now firmly under state control or influence.
Channels of independent information are threatened by Russia’s recent testing of a “sovereign internet,”
which would regulate or cutoff data from outside the nation. At the point of information reception,
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Russian web-enabled devices such as smart phones, smart TVs, and computers are now required by law to
come preinstalled with Russian applications. While billed as a way to strengthen local software
companies’ ability to compete with the west, the greater prevalence of Russian applications eases softpower pressures. Since these applications are built by companies subject to Russian law, the ability to
influence or control content, data analysis, and user-tracking are increased.
Additionally, the Russian government actively removes political resistance. Russia consistently blames
“color Revolutions” in its near abroad on western interference. Yet, targeted killings and arrests of
opposition figures in Russia seem to increase yearly. Many note that these incidents represent a clear
message not to the dissenters, but to prevent dissension from spreading. The latest addition to this list,
Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, represents not just an individual attack or a message to others.
Instead, Navalny’s poisoning and arrest began a campaign to dismantle the Progress Party and other
underlying resistance machinery. As seen in Table 6, by eliminating paths of resistance, Putin removes
some of the worst scoring outcomes for himself. With a docile domicile, instead of balancing between the
liberal order and domestic support, he basically returns to a two –player game where the consent of the
population is inherent in any decision he makes. The resulting new game is seen in Table 7. From there he
can work on factors to improve his scoring in the competition outcomes.
Table 6 – Putin and the government eliminate resistance to reshape the game.
Putin
Competition

Liberal
Order

Stay Out of It
Active Involvement

Supports
Putin
(-1,3,3)
(-1,2,2)

Conflict

Russian People
Not
Supports
Support
Putin
(-1,2,-2)
(2,2,-1)
(-2,-2,2)
(1,-1,-2)

Not
Support
(-1,-2, 1)
(-3,-3,-3)

Table 7 - The reshaped game provides less risk to Putin and his supporters.
Putin
People
Liberal
Order

Stay Out of It
Active Involvement

Competition
(-1,3,3)
(-1,2,2)

Conflict
(2,2,-1)
(1,-1,-2)

There are a variety of other means that Putin could employ to put the odds of the game in his favor.
During military activity, Russia is careful to mask its true number of casualties. Also, masking casualties
prevents a foothold to domestic opposition. Putin will use opportunities to leverage areas in the Middle
East and North Africa as testing beds for his equipment and forces, maintain readiness for missions closer
to home. Misinformation will be used both to reduce credibility of adversaries, while boosting the
credibility of others. International forums and groups will be used to block liberal consensus. This list of
approaches is not exhaustive.
5

CONCLUSION

The world is a messy, dynamic place. The idea of a “world order” may only be possible as just that – an
idea. There are periods of greater relative order and periods of relative disorder. Some factors of the
international system remain static, while others change dramatically. The transitory nature of the
international system often echoes the past. But these configurations also change over time, so if we want
to understand how a particular world order may appear in the future, it is not enough to rely on history
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alone. While the outcomes may not come true as forecasted, the process provides value to think through
the components of the problem of ordering and order. When the game was created in June of 2021, it
foreshadowed many of today’s current events. The conclusions and analysis in this contemporary version
are unchanged from the draft from a year ago.
The game took various factors into account, making it possible to see a traditional realist “great man” type
leader, holding together a quasi-modern state, which is enabled with some capabilities of a post-modern
state. This “great man” continues to try and become greater, because he is leading an illiberal democracy
that he engineered for his own enrichment. The drive toward the accumulation of power helps explain
inconsistent actions. For example, China represents a much clearer threat to the territorial status quo for
Russia, not a liberal west. However, liberal ideas do represent a direct threat to the rule and wealth of
Vladimir Putin. Limited by a nuclear cap on escalation, Putin cannot directly confront the west where
they have established institutions such as NATO, because of existential threat to him, his supporters, and
his country. Instead, he aligns the nation with China and acts militarily in an echo of Russia’s former
sphere of influence, where institutions do not exist.
Although his action may be immoral, Putin is not irrational given his goals. Not only is he playing his
game strategically, he is also playing that game with an exceedingly difficult hand. Moreover, he is not
just managing the play of the game; he seeks to actively redesign the game over extended periods of
time, to his advantage. His outcomes are based on the self-interest of an autocrat, dedicated to remaining
and expanding power. For the time being the biggest threat to his desired outcomes is wrestling control
from a domestic audience. The good news for NATO is that a large-scale war is not in Putin’s interest, so
as long as Article 5 deterrence is clear, its members should not fear conventional or nuclear war on their
territories. However, there is no respite for the rest of Russia’s near abroad who do not fall under NATO’s
Article 5 protective umbrella, most recently demonstrated in Ukraine. Unfortunately for them, either an
escalation of response for non-NATO defense, or the integration of these countries inside of NATO is
inadvisable, as it is likely to degrade the barrier for Putin to act, not reinforce inactivity. Unfortunately,
any expansion of international pressure likely reinforces Putin’s weaponized narrative to his domestic
audience that the liberal order is bent on destroying the motherland.
Meanwhile, Putin will continue attacking his weaker neighbors and his internal opposition. If he can
continue containing visible costs, human or resource, of this military activity, most of the Russian people
are likely to see strength. External violence towards subtly signals back to his population that he is not to
be trifled with, further repressing opposition. The life of the autocrat is one of perpetual motion, that if
stopped will lead to the end of his reign, challenge his wealth, or perhaps his life. Faced with a personal
existential threat, the liberal order should not expect a sudden change in Putin’s behavior soon. However,
if the word of military failure spreads far enough domestically, Putin may mind that Ukraine is the
overreach that even his cult of personality cannot recover from. Further, this game explored motivations,
not capabilities. A major disadvantage of autocracy is that erodes trust and makes realistic assessments
difficult. This fact is demonstrated by Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine. This game demonstrates that
Putin is acting rationally to maximize his benefits, whether we like those outcomes or not. Those who
have classified Putin as a bad strategist may be mistaking bad behavior from a values perspective, for bad
strategy. In that case we may be missing the true moral of the story – how bad we are at recognizing the
game being play. When that is missed, it is difficult to play the game well ourselves.
The impact to the world order is this. The United States and the western liberal order are dealing with a
modern state, with some post-modern capabilities. However, this nation is led by an autocrat who is more
concerned about his survival, enrichment, and legacy than to act in the way that state-based international
theories expect rational states to behave. This is not a battle of ideologies; it is about society versus a
personality. As long as President Vladimir Putin continues to leverage the shared cultural imagination of
Russia, he will evoke ghosts from the pasts for his benefits, instead of preparing for the inevitable arrival
of the dragon at his tsarist-Potemkin kingdom’s backdoor. When the signs of China’s true intentions
cannot be dismissed, Russia will do what it has in recent history – align itself with the liberal west.
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